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The Minefield of Liability for Minors:




The world is laden with risks.' The average person has a one in
10,000 risk of dying in a bathtub, a one in 4,800 gamble of being killed
by a falling object, a greater chance of being attacked by a cow than a
shark, and is more likely to be killed by a champagne cork than a bite
from a poisonous spider.2 Over time, capitalism and the American legal
system have proposed a solution-the liability waiver, a mechanism
under which one party agrees not to hold the other party responsible for
resulting damages.3 In the face of an ancient African proverb that
teaches, "it takes a village to raise a child,"4 the Florida Supreme Court
* The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and are not reflective of
Baker & McKenzie or its affiliates. The author would like to acknowledge Randi J. Spector for
her encouragement in drafting this article, Stephen J. Schnably for his endearing joy for law
teaching, Kenneth G. Elzinga for imparting the Jeffersonian pursuit of knowledge, Harout J.
Samra for steadfast support, Patricia D. White for her guidance, and the editors of the University
of Miami Law Review for their dedication in preparing this article for publication.
t Jordan A. Dresnick practices commercial litigation and antitrust law with Baker &
McKenzie in Miami, Florida. Mr. Dresnick earned a B.A. with Distinction and Phi Beta Kappa in
Quantitative Finance from the University of Virginia, a D.E.L.F. from the French Ministry of
Education in Paris, France, a J.D., magna cum laude, from the University of Miami School of
Law, and is an M. Fin. candidate at The University of Chicago.
1. Franqois Ewald, Risk in Contemporary Society, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 365, 365-66 (Jean-
Marc Dautrey & Claire F. Stifler trans.) (2000). According to Ewald,
Risk has become ubiquitous and a kind of conceptual umbrella used to cover all
sorts of events, be they individual or collective, minor or catastrophic. Risk presents
itself as the modem approach to an event and the way in which, in our societies, we
reflect upon issues that concern us. Risk is the single point upon which
contemporary societies question themselves, analyze themselves, seek their values
and, perhaps, recognize their limits.
Id. at 366.
2. Robert S. Nelson, Comment, The Theory of the Waiver Scale: An Argument Why Parents
Should be Able to Waive Their Children's Tort Liability Claims, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 535, 535
(2002).
3. See generally Note, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69 VA. L. Rav. 1111 (1983)
(discussing consumer waivers of product-liability rights); Andrew Manno, Note, A High Price to
Compete: The Feasibility and Effect of Waivers Used to Protect Schools From Liability for
Injuries to Athletes with High Medical Risks, 79 Ky. L.J. 867 (1991) (discussing student-athlete
waivers).
4. See, e.g., HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS
CHILDREN TEACH US (1996).
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recently echoed that it also takes a court to protect the property rights of
children after parents sign preinjury waivers on behalf of minors.5 This
article examines the new shift of jurisprudence toward increased
accountability and its implications on corporate risk management.
In Kirton v. Fields, the Florida Supreme Court confronted the issue
of whether a parent may bind a minor's estate by a preinjury release.6
The case hinged on the competing rights of a parent or guardian to raise
her child free of the state's reign and the interest of the state in providing
for the safety and well-being of minors. The court held that a preinjury
release executed by a parent on behalf of a minor was unenforceable
against the minor's estate for torts resulting from the child's participa-
tion in a commercial activity.7 The opinion raises more questions than
answers, namely as to the limits of the holding. For example, in the
wake of Kirton, are liability waivers valid for school-sponsored activi-
ties?8 Are such waivers enforceable for community-related activities?
What does the future minefield for liability for minors hold for corporate
risk management?
This article discusses the facts and procedures leading to the opin-
ion in Kirton, a survey of related precedent of courts throughout the state
and nation, the movement afoot by businesses across Florida currently
lobbying the state legislature to overturn the case, and the gapping ques-
tions left unanswered by the Florida Supreme Court, such as the validity
of waivers that release volunteers from liability in the volunteer and
school setting. The article proceeds as follows: Part II introduces corpo-
rate risk management; Part III sets the backdrop of the emergence of tort
liability in American jurisprudence; Part IV describes the facts of Kirton
v. Fields and the opinions rendered by the Florida Supreme Court, Flor-
ida District Court of Appeal, and trial court; Part V traces the rich con-
flict and harmony among the cases on preinjury waiver of liability to
minors and arbitration-setting clauses; Part VI and VII analyze the
implications of the decision on corporate risk management both in Flor-
ida and across the nation; and Part VIII provides some concluding
remarks.
5. See Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2008).
6. Id. at 350.
7. Id. at 358.
8. See id. at 350 n.2. The Florida Supreme Court specifically noted,
We answer the certified question as to pre-injury releases in commercial activities
because that is what this case involves. Our decision in this case should not be read
as limiting our reasoning only to pre-injury releases involving commercial activity;
however, any discussion on pre-injury releases in noncommercial activities would
be dicta and it is for that reason we do not discuss the broader question posed by the
Fifth District.
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II. THE MODERN STATE OF CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT
"[R]isk management is the practice of assessing and identifying the
[myriad] risks facing a person, an institution, or society because of its
activities and environment, determining the likelihood of losses and
other consequences from those risks, and taking appropriate actions,"
which include monitoring the risks and reducing the potential damage
and related consequences. 9 Although risk management is most fre-
quently applied to investments,' 0 recent scholarship"' and federal legis-
lation 2 have highlighted the role of risk in corporate governance.
Enterprise risk management is the procedure by which a corporation's
officers and directors define the firm's strategies and objectives so as to
arrive at an optimal balance between growth, return, and risk manage-
ment.' 3 Risk can take several forms for companies, including accounting
9. James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in
Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 731 (2009).
10. See generally Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: Were the Measures Used to Evaluate
Wall Street Trades Flawed?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 24 (discussing the "Value at Risk"
model for measuring the risk in investment portfolios).
11. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J.
CORP. L. 967 (2009); Susan Schmidt Bies, Member, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Keynote Address at the International Symposium on Risk Management and Derivatives (Oct. 8,
2002), in 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 81, 82 (2003) (discussing the role that "risk management
can play in strengthening corporate governance"); Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez,
Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and Corporate Governance, 39 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 591
(2008) ("Our system of corporate governance is flawed. It is now apparent that CEOs may exploit
excessive autonomy to impose excessive long term risks on their firms in the name of greater
profits and compensation today.").
12. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.); see also Brent J. Horton, How
Corporate Lawyers Escaped Sarbanes-Oxley: Disparate Treatment in the Legislative Process, 60
S.C. L. REV. 149, 202 (2008). According to Horton,
Like the lawyers of the 1920s, the lawyers of today enabled-indeed cooked up-
the legal structures that resulted in the fall of Enron; now, like in 1934, There is
little to suggest that the Bar has yet recognized that it must bear some burden of
responsibility for these evils. Instead, corporate officers and accountants-both of
whom made easier legislative targets-shouldered the burden of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Id. at 202 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted).
13. Comm. OF* SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM'N, ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT-INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 1 (2004), http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/
COSOERMExecutiveSummary.pdf.
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fraud,'4  labor relations, 5  securities fraud, 16  lack of internal
14. One of the largest accounting frauds in history came to light in 2001, with the unexpected
collapse of Enron. Enron's President Jeffrey Skilling and Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lay
focused on increasing the company's stock price to maximize their bonuses and compensation. In
an attempt to keep the market's attention on the company, Lay and Skilling created new ventures
and businesses, many of which were largely unsuccessful. The company maintained a complex set
of offshore partnerships and accounts that were specifically kept off the accounting statements of
the corporation to mask losses, artificially increase earnings, and avoid taxes. These entities made
Enron appear more profitable than it was in reality and created a perilous helix in which
executives would have to perform a greater number of twisted financial deceptions each passing
quarter to maintain the fagade of billions in profits while the company was actually quickly
diminishing in value. This process drove the stock price to record levels. Although many insiders
and executives at Enron were all too familiar with the offshore accounts and fraudulent accounting
practices, the stunning neglect for corporate risk management kept the practices concealed from
investors. The ultimate collapse of Enron was notable not only due to the sheer volume and scale
of the accounting fraud, but also because many of the company's former directors had to settle
suits by personally paying large sums and because Enron's demise led to the dissolution of the
company's independent auditors, Arthur Anderson. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy Lessons from Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787 (2002); Erica
Beecher-Monas, Enron, Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a Global Economy, 37
IND. L. REV. 141 (2003); George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public
Accounting Before and After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403 (2002); Jeffrey
N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002); David Millon, Who
"Caused" the Enron Debacle?, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul
D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 9 (2002).
15. See, e.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 85,
108-09 (2000).
The most notorious example of such a casualty is Texaco Oil Company, and the
unfortunate Texaco shareholders during the time that the racism within Texaco
came to light. Texaco's nightmare began in 1994, when African-American
employees filed a class action lawsuit alleging pervasive racial discrimination. The
extent of Texaco's discriminatory misconduct came to light in late 1996, when a
senior executive released highly controversial tapes that appeared to contain racial
slurs emblematic of a racially hostile environment. Once allegations of Texaco's
misconduct surfaced, its shareholders suffered stunning losses, as its market
capitalization plunged by $1 billion. Subsequent reports demonstrated that the tapes
were not isolated circumstances of racial bigotry, but that instead such attitudes
appeared to have permeated Texaco's business culture. Ultimately Texaco paid
$176 million, the largest amount ever paid in a racial discrimination suit, to settle
the class action claims of over 1,400 African-American employees. Texaco also
suffered from a serious bout of negative publicity that caused investors to flee the
company and consumers to threaten boycotts.
Id. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted).
16. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged Qwest Communications
International Inc., one of the largest telecommunications companies in the United States, with
securities fraud and other violations of the federal securities laws for fraudulently recognizing
over $3.8 billion in revenue and excluding $231 million in expenses as part of a "fraudulent
scheme to meet optimistic and unsupportable revenue and earnings projections. Without admitting
or denying the allegations in the complaint, Qwest consented to entry of a judgment enjoining it
from violating the antifraud, reporting, books and records, internal control, proxy, and securities
registration provisions of the federal securities laws." Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
1034 [Vol. 64:1031
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controls,"7 and weak corporate governance. 8 However, one of the most
significant risks faced by a company is the potential for bet-the-company
litigation."
Many businesses today could easily be bankrupted not only by a
single bet-the-company suit,20 but by a series of smaller claims whose
aggregate value is worth more than the assets of the company. Consider,
for example, several lawsuits brought against the Walt Disney World
Company. Disney is not only one of the largest and most successful
companies in the world,2 I but it also caters largely to children.22 One of
Disney's main attractions, the Walt Disney World theme park, is located
Charges Qwest Communications International Inc. with Multi-Faceted Accounting and Financial
Reporting Fraud (Oct. 21, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-148.htm.
17. See, e.g., Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 11, at 575 (describing how a rogue trader at
Barings Bank acted both as a trader and manager, essentially supervising himself, and in the
absence of proper oversight was able to disguise $1.3 billion in trading losses into the branch's
error account).
18. In 2002, telecommunications giant WorldCom admitted that an internal audit revealed
improper accounting of over $3.9 billion in expenses. WorldCom said that accounting
irregularities involving expenses and capital expenditures inflated its cash flow and that otherwise
it would have reported a net loss for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. In the aftermath of the
ensuing investigations, many cited WorldCom's corporate governance for failing to investigate
multi-billion dollar transfers between internal accounts, none of which conformed to GAAP
(Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). See, e.g., Marianne M. Jennings, Restoring Ethical
Gumption in the Corporation: A Federalist Paper on Corporate Governance-Restoration of
Active Virtue in the Corporate Structure to Curb the "YeeHaw Culture" in Organizations, 3 Wyo.
L. REV. 387, 410-29 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987). In January
1984, the Board of Directors of Getty Oil Company and several related companies approved an
oral agreement in principle to sell Getty to Pennzoil. Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 11, at 573.
Texaco subsequently interfered with this agreement, and a jury awarded $11 billion to Pennzoil
against Texaco, which was the largest civil judgment at the time. Id. Texaco then had to declare
bankruptcy and ultimately settled for three billion dollars. Id. The case highlighted the risks faced
by the Board of Directors of Texaco of interfering in the sale of Getty: becoming involved in
significant litigation, declaring bankruptcy, and then facing the consequences of a $3 billion
settlement.
20. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 768.
21. See The Walt Disney Company and Affiliated Companies - Careers, http://corporate.
disney.go.com/careers/index.html (last visited Jan. 1, 2010). According to Disney's website,
Fortune magazine annually surveys more than 15,000 top executives, directors and
members of the financial community to generate its Most Admired Companies list.
This year, for the first time, Fortune combined the America's Most Admired
Companies and World's Most Admired Companies survey results into one. After
taking the top spot in all nine industry categories, ranging from people management,
use of corporate assets and management quality to innovation, Disney was named
No. 1 Most Admired Entertainment Company in the world! In addition, Disney
ranked No. 13 on Fortune's overall list of the World's Most Admired Companies.
Id.
22. See Carmine Gallo, How Disney Works to Win Repeat Customers, Bus. WK., Dec. 1,
2009, http://www.businessweek.comlsmallbiz/content/nov2009/sb20091130_866423.htm.
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in Orlando and is therefore particularly applicable when considering the
implications of Kirton v. Fields on Florida-based corporations.
Since Walt Disney World was first developed in the late 1960s,
"Disney has grown to include four theme parks, more than twenty on-
site hotels which encompass more than 20,000 rooms, three water parks,
five 18-hole championship golf courses, a speedway, and numerous
other world class amenities."23 The robust success of Disney "spurred
the growth of nearby Orlando, from a small city into a huge metropolis,
[boasting] one of the busiest airports in the country. ' 24 Disney has a
huge economic impact on Florida by attracting more than forty million
visitors to the state, paying hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes each
year, and gaining the role as one of the state's largest employers. 25
Along with the millions of visitors to the amusement parks each
year, Walt Disney World must also contend with thousands of actual and
potential lawsuits. For a company as large and diversified as Disney,
matters may be brought involving adult guests,26 minor guests,27
23. Kent Wetherell, Florida Law Because of and According to Mickey: The "Top 5" Florida
Cases and Statues Involving Walt Disney World, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (footnotes
omitted).
24. Id. at 2 ("When people think of Florida, they think of beaches and Disney World ....
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Walt Disney World Co. v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987). A commentator
describes the case as follows:
In November 1971 (only a month after Disney opened), [park guest] Aloysia
Wood was injured after her fiance rear-ended the vehicle she was driving on the
grand prix raceway (now known as Tomorrowland Indy Speedway) in the Magic
Kingdom. Ms. Wood sued Disney and its insurer, and after a jury trial, she was
awarded damages of $75,000. The jury found Ms. Wood to be fourteen percent at
fault, her fianc6 to be eighty-five percent at fault, and Disney to be only one percent
at fault. Notwithstanding its nominal level of fault, judgment was entered against
Disney for eighty-six percent of the damages, since at that time [of the decision],
Florida law imposed joint and several liability on joint tortfeasors. Disney appealed
to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal, which affirmed the judgment. The
Fourth District certified a question of great public importance to the Florida
Supreme Court, which was whether joint and several liability should be abolished.
The Florida Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, answered the certified
question in the negative and affirmed the Fourth District's decision. The majority
"recogniz[ed] the logic in Disney's position" that it should not be required to pay
eighty-six percent of the damages when it was only one percent at fault; the court
still refused to abolish joint and several liability and left the viability of the doctrine
to the legislature.
Wetherell, supra note 23, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Wood, 515 So. 2d at 202).
27. See, e.g., Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(involving a ten-year-old whose thumb was amputated); Walt Disney World Co. v. Goode, 501
So. 2d 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (involving a four-year-old who drowned at Magic
Kingdom). For further discussion of Blalock and Goode, see Wetherell, supra note 23, at 13-15,
19-20.
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employees, 28 and even access to the corporation's records.29 The volume
and factual complexity of these select cases speak not only to the
resources required to defend such cases, but also illustrate that many
cases can spur through litigation for a decade or longer.30 These disputes
also provide anecdotal evidence of the myriad facets springing litigation
to American corporations.3" Without a doubt, a lack of proper risk man-
agement can lead to the entity's rapid demise.32
As companies target the bottom line of their accounting statements
to augment profits, there has been a pronounced shift toward anticipat-
ing and hedging against potential litigation.33 A popular vehicle to meet
28. See, e.g., Bardy v. Walt Disney World Co., 643 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
[Michael] Bardy, a Disney employee, claims he became voluntarily intoxicated
while attending an employee party sponsored by Disney and held on Disney's
premises. Before the party ended, Bardy went to his car in the parking lot to lie
down. A security guard employed by Disney discovered Bardy sleeping in the car.
Despite Bardy's protestations that he was too intoxicated to drive, Bardy claims the
guard ordered him to move the car and leave the premises. The guard also
threatened that if Bardy was not gone when he returned, the guard would have
Bardy arrested. Some time later, Bardy attempted to drive the car off the premises,
but after driving only about 500 feet, his car struck a light pole and Bardy was
injured. He sued Disney to recover damages for his injuries.
Id. at 47. Although the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Walt Disney World, the
appellate court reversed, finding that Disney could theoretically be held liable if a jury determined
that the security guard's actions caused Bardy's injuries:
If there is no duty to come to the assistance of a person in difficulty or peril, there is
at least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation worse. When
we cross the line into the field of "misfeasance," liability is far easier to find ....
There may be no duty to take care of a man who is ill or intoxicated, and unable to
look out for himself; but it is another thing entirely to eject him into the danger of a
railroad yard; and if he is injured there will be liability.
Id. at 47-48 (alteration in original) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 56, at 343 (4th ed. 1971)).
29. See, e.g., Sipkema v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 697 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (per curiam). The "case arose when the Sipkemas attempted to use the Public Records Act
to obtain copies of the security manual, traffic citations, and accident reports maintained by
Disney" following a fatal accident that claimed the life of their son during a high-speed chase by
Disney security. Wetherell, supra note 23, at 21 & n.121.
30. See, e.g., Walt Disney World Co. v. Goode, 501 So. 2d 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986),
review dismissed, 520 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1988). The incident giving rise to this case occurred in
1977, id. at 623, more than ten years before the final disposition of the case.
31. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 11, at 571 ("[T]he modem corporation may well face
a myriad of risks from disparate fields of business ranging from complex financial risk to quality
control regarding material manufactured in China." (footnote omitted)).
32. See generally Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Role of Outside Counsel in the Creation of
Economic Value, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 113 (1998) (discussing a regional bank holding
company's relationships with its outside counsel and how the relationships relate to the firm's
primary mission of creating economic value).
33. In fact, corporations often cause injury to parties who do not participate in the enterprise
as owners, employees, or customers, thus giving rise to "enterprise liability." Mark Geistfeld,
Should Enterprise Liability Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous
Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REv. 611, 612 (1998). "[U]nless the business was negligent, it is
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this goal has come in the guise of risk management, which is still a
young and evolving discipline.34 Proper risk management involves
determining which of a corporation's activities creates a potential for
loss or exposure to liability and then calculating the expected lOSS.
35
Although the liability waiver emerged decades ago as an attempt to
shield corporate coffers against the piercing arrows of plaintiffs' coun-
sel, the jurisprudence in the area has been suffocated with significant
clout.36 This article addresses the manner in which the Florida Supreme
Court's opinion in Kirton v. Fields37 changes the lush landscape of
deflecting liability toward the consumer.
III. BACKGROUND: THE RISE AND ATTEMPTED DEMISE OF
TORT LIABILITY
A. The Threat of Tort Liability
Tort law is premised on the notion that the fear of liability for fall-
ing below a required standard of care is an effective incentive, which
leads to an increase in the quality of goods and services.38 That level is
generally defined as negligence, which is characterized as "failure to
exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would
have exercised in a similar situation. '39 The compensation rationale for
tort liability can be traced to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
states that "the purposes for which actions of tort are maintainable...
are: (a) to give compensation, indemnity or restitution for harms; (b) to
determine rights; (c) to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct;
and (d) to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and unlawful
self-help."4 ° However, this raises particular concern for charitable orga-
nizations because of the potentially stiffening effect on discouraging
ordinarily not liable for the injuries of someone with whom it did not have a contractual
relationship." Id. For further discussion of "enterprise liability," see Mark Geistfeld, Implementing
Enterprise Liability: A Comment on Henderson and Twerksi, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157 (1992), and
Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1266 (1997).
34. Bainbridge, supra note 11, at 982.
35. Brent E. Dyer, Risk Management and its Application to Air Carrier Safety, 62 J. AIR L. &
COM. 491, 494 (1996). However, "[t]he potential amount is not simply the total amount the entity
stands to lose. Rather, it is the total potential loss multiplied by the percentage chance that the loss
will occur." Id.
36. See, e.g., Note, supra note 3, at 1114-15.
37. 997 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2008).
38. Andrew F. Popper, A One-Term Tort Reform Tale: Victimizing the Vulnerable, 35 HARv.
J. ON LEGIS. 123, 134 (1998).
39. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1133 (9th ed. 2009).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979).
1038 [Vol. 64:1031
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volunteerism.4"
B. The Impact of Tort Law on Volunteerism
Volunteerism has been historically labeled by many commentators
as the "Third Sector"42 of the American economy and includes services
rendered in schools, churches, temples, libraries, and little league
teams.43 Hundreds of thousands of Americans work for nonprofit enti-
ties, and millions more volunteer or contribute to the charitable causes
each year." The U.S. Supreme Court has defined the charitable sector
with a broad brush, "A charitable use, where neither law nor public pol-
icy forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to promote the
well-doing and well-being of social man."45 Although the charitable sec-
tor is expansive, diverse, and expanding, it is not well defined.46
The Internal Revenue Service provides helpful guidance for charac-
terizing the philanthropic sector by defining "charitable" in "its gener-
ally accepted legal sense."47 To qualify for tax exemption, an
organization must have a charitable purpose,4 8 function "in harmony
41. See Bradley C. Canon & Dean Jaros, The Impact of Changes in Judicial Doctrine: The
Abrogation of Charitable Immunity, 13 LAW & Soc'y REV. 969, 971-72 (1979).
42. See, e.g., James Cook, Businessmen with Halos, FORBES, Nov. 26, 1990, at 100 (finding
that nonprofit institutions generate annual revenues exceeding $750 billion-roughly 15% of the
nation's GNP).
43. David W. Hartmann, Volunteer Immunity: Maintaining the Vitality of the Third Sector of
Our Economy, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 63, 72-73 (1989); see also Developments in the Law-
Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1581 (1992) (finding nonprofit corporations
encompass recognizable entities like the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army, as well as
less-known organizations, such as soup kitchens, political associations, business leagues, social
clubs, sports leagues, schools and hospitals, and even law reviews, the Federalist Society, and the
Star Trek Fan Club).
44. See Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, supra note 43.
45. Ould v. Wash. Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303, 311 (1877) ("Whatever is given for the
love of God, or the love of your neighbor, in the catholic and universal sense, -given from these
motives and to these ends, free from the stain or taint of every consideration that is personal,
private, or selfish." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
46. Charles Robert Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 401, 406 (1991).
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1998).
48. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
10392010]
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with the public interest, '49 serve a sufficiently broad public,5 ° and "not
allow its resources to 'inure to the benefit' of any private person. '"51
Although this guidance from the federal tax code provides insight to the
parameters that separate charitable organizations from for-profit corpo-
rations, the operative issue in the wake of Kirton v. Fields is whether
applying that same standard to volunteers will adversely affect the inter-
est to become involved in community-enriching endeavors.
C. A Carve Out for Tort Liability
Throughout history, charities have traditionally been treated differ-
ently than for-profit entities when it comes to the rules of preinjury
waiver.5" This concept was first articulated in the 1876 decision of
McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital53 and later became known
as the doctrine of charitable immunity. There, the court granted immu-
nity to a hospital because of its charitable status. 4 By the middle of the
twentieth century, jurists began to critically challenge the charitable-
immunity doctrine.55 These challenges came to bear particularly potent
light with a series of high-profile cases that refocused attention on the
dire need to provide special consideration for charitable organizations.56
49. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983).
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers are
affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction for the donor means that other
taxpayers can be said to be indirect and vicarious "donors." Charitable exemptions
are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit-a benefit
which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or
which supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported
by tax revenues. History buttresses logic to make clear that, to warrant exemption
under § 501 (c)(3), an institution must fall within a category specified in that section
and must demonstrably serve and be in harmony with the public interest. The
institution's purpose must not be so at odds with the common community
conscience as to undermine any public benefit that might otherwise be conferred.
Id. at 591-92 (footnotes omitted).
50. See Rev. Rul. 56-403, 1956-2 C.B. 307, 1956 IRB LEXIS 101.
51. Tremper, supra note 46, at 407 (citing Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980)).
52. See Melinda Smith, Note, Tort Immunity for Volunteers in Ohio: Zivich v. Mentor Soccer
Club, Inc., 32 AKRON L. REv. 699, 699-702 (1999).
53. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
54. Id. at 435-36.
55. Smith, supra note 52, at 700-01 (noting that proponents of charitable immunity have
proposed four theories to support their argument: (1) the trust fund theory, which focuses on the
intent of donors and therefore prohibits the use of funds donated for charitable purposes to satisfy
tort awards; (2) the inapplicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior to charitable
organizations; (3) the implied waiver theory that participants in charitable events have waived suit
against the charity; and (4) underlying public policy grounds against allowing scarce charitable
resources to be claimed by individuals benefiting from charities).
56. See, e.g., Tremper, supra note 46, at 402 (citing Damond Benningfield, Who's Minding
the Nonprofits?, Tzx. INSUROR, Jan./Feb. 1987; Kristen A. Goss, Boy Scouts of America Win
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At the same time, Congress, while limited in passing tort legislation,57
began proposing solutions to reform suits against nonprofits. 8 As the
literature increasingly turned to examine these pressing issues, 59 more
ideas flowed to cool the fires slowly bursting on the scene.
D. The Emergence of the Liability Waiver
A person generally becomes liable in tort when his conduct falls
below that required of a reasonable person under the circumstances.6 ° In
light of the significance of tort liability, the waiver emerged as a means
by which one party agrees to carry risk that would have otherwise been
shouldered by the other party.6" Courts have recognized both a release
and an indemnity agreement. The release surrenders legal rights or obli-
gations between the parties to an agreement, 2 thus extinguishing a
potential claim or cause of action in the same manner as a prior judg-
ment between the parties. 63 A release is an absolute bar to any right of
action on the released matter64 and may also be raised as an affirmative
defense in some states.
An indemnity agreement, on the other hand, is "[a] collateral con-
tract or assurance, by which one person engages to secure another
against an anticipated loss or to prevent him from being damnified by
Victory in Sex Abuse Case; Jury Fails to Find Negligence by National Organization, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 24, 1989, at 15; Thomas Heath, $ 45,000 Award to Molested Va. Youth
Hailed as Victory by Scouts, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1989, at DI; Lisa Green Markoff, A
Volunteer's Thankless Task, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 1; David Rohn, YMCA, Pool Victim
Settle: 5-Year-Old to Get $4,000 a Month Initially, WASH. POST, May 17, 1978, at A4; Gary
Taylor, Goodwill Must Pay $5M in Murder by Parolee-Employee, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1987, at
22).
57. Congress is limited in its ability to enact tort-related legislation, as Amendment X and
Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution confine federal authority in the absence of interstate
commerce.
58. See Volunteer Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 911, 101st Cong. (1989).
59. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REv. 501
(1990).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (noting that a party will be liable if
he negligently causes injury to another, whose own conduct did not unreasonably contribute to
that injury).
61. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1993). The court
defined a release as:
A contractual arrangement whereby one party assumes the liability inherent in a
situation, thereby relieving the other party of responsibility .... [An] [a]greement
or contract in which one party agrees to hold the other without responsibility for
damage or other liability arising out of the transaction involved.
Id. (alterations in original) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (5th ed. 1979)).
62. Cox v. Robison, 150 S.W. 1149, 1155 (Tex. 1912).
63. Hart v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 189 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1945).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
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the legal consequences of an act or forbearance on the part of one of the
parties or of some third person."'66 An indemnity agreement is a promise
to safeguard or hold the indemnitee harmless against either existing and/
or future loss liability. 67 Although indemnity agreements, releases, waiv-
ers, and exculpatory agreements all operate to transfer risk,68 the focus
of this article is on liability waivers signed by parents releasing third
parties from potential claims by children who are later injured by the
third party.
The waiver yields significant power in the shifting of tort liabil-
ity. 69 Even if clearly at fault, a business or corporate entity will not be
held liable for a customer's injury if the customer signed a valid
waiver. 70 In many regards, the tort waiver appears contrary to the gen-
eral consensus that tort law promotes socially desirable behavior. 71 At
the same time, many scholars take the opposite approach, contending
that tort is simply a method of inefficient deterrence.72 Some argue that
people behave like mice "in psychologist's maze of electrical shocks,"
in which they "are directed away from conduct that brings the sting of
tort liability and toward those channels of activity where the sting is
avoided. 73 However, such assumptions are based on models of rational
behavior and symmetric information. In reality, many consumers are
neither well informed about a company's previous negligent actions, nor
are they fully rational actors.7 4 In turn, this economic truism brings us
full circle to the origin: namely the judicial inquiry to determine whether
parents should be endowed with the power to waive the rights of their
children against potential liability.
66. Dresser Indus., 853 S.w.2d at 508 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (5th ed. 1979)).
67. See Russell v. Lemons, 205 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
68. Dresser Indus., 853 S.W.2d at 508.
69. See, e.g., Jeff Kessler, Note, Dollar Signs on the Muscle... and the Ligament, Tendon,
and Ulnar Nerve: Institutional Liability Arising from Injuries to Student-Athletes, 3 VA. J. SPORTS
& L. 80, 83-86 (2001) (discussing the import of liability waivers on student athletes and
universities).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 cmt. a (1981) ("[A] party to a contract
can ordinarily exempt himself from liability for harm caused by his failure to observe the standard
of reasonable care imposed by the law of negligence. ").
71. Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 559 (1985).
72. Id. at 561 n.12 (citing DONALD HARRIS ET AL., COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS
AND INJURY 328 (1984) ("Deterrence of carelessness operates in a random way .... ); TERENCE
G. ISON, THE FORENSIC LOTTERY 89 (1967) ("[T]he value of tort liability as a deterrent . . . is
thought on the whole to be negligible."); John G. Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L.
REV. 1193, 1198 (1984) ("[Olne must be skeptical about the effectiveness of tort law in promoting
accident prevention".)).
73. Id. at 561.
74. See Ralph Nader & Joseph A. Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CAL.
L. REv. 645, 647-48 (1967).
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IV. WALKING THE MINEFIELD OF LIABILITY FOR MINORS
A. Factual and Procedural Background of Kirton v. Fields
In Fields v. Kirton, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed
summary judgment and certified the following question to the Florida
Supreme Court as one of great public importance: "whether a parent
may bind a minor's estate by the pre-injury execution of a release."75
The facts pivot on the rights of a parent to decide those activities appro-
priate for her minor children against the state's interest in intermeddling
on behalf of a minor child, as parens patriae.76
Bobby Jones was the primary residential parent for his fourteen-
year-old son Christopher.77 In May 2003, Jones took his son to a sports
motor park to drive an all-terrain vehicle ("ATV").78 To gain entry into
the park and ride the ATV, Jones signed several documents of legal
import, including a release, a waiver of liability, assumption of risk, and
an indemnity agreement.79 While operating the ATV, the minor lost con-
trol on a particular jump and was ejected, hitting the ground, whereupon
the vehicle landed on top of him, taking the minor's life."°
Jordan Fields, the minor's personal representative, brought a
wrongful death claim against the owners, operators, and manager of the
park." The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment, noting the lack of genuine issue of material fact because Jones had
"willfully and with full understanding" executed the preinjury release on
behalf of his son. 2 Further, Jones filed an affidavit stating that it was his
intention to waive the right to sue for the death of his child and that the
release served to forever discharge the defendants of any and all loss or
damage and any claim or demands due to the injury of the minor or his
property.8 3 The trial court specifically relied on the enforceability of the
preinjury release and waiver signed by Jones, as the natural guardian, on
behalf of the deceased child in dismissing the case.84
Reviewing the trial court's ruling de novo, the Fourth District
affirmed that the material facts were not in dispute but reversed the
lower court's enforcement of the release, thus enabling the plaintiff to
75. Fields v. Kirton, 961 So. 2d 1127, 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007), affd, 997 So. 2d 349
(Fla. 2008).
76. Id.




81. Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. 2008).
82. Id. at 351 & n.3.
83. Id. at 351 n.3.
84. See id. at 351.
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litigate the wrongful death claim.85 Although the lower court's ruling
did not comport with the Florida Constitution, which grants parents the
right to make decisions affecting their children without governmental
interference, 86 the Fourth District differentiated between this constitu-
tional right and the release of any form of negligence.87 In effect, the
release forfeited the minor's property rights to seek legal redress against
the commercial activity provider-here, the ATV park.88 Relying on
Florida statutes89 and common law,9° the appellate court cited a control-
ling statutory provision on preinjury releases signed by a parent for her
child.9 The Florida legislature has given clear guidance regarding when
the state, as parens patriae, must act on behalf of minors, such as in the
case of juvenile delinquency and dependency. 9 "It is not the function of
the courts to usurp the constitutional role of the legislature and judicially
85. Fields, 961 So. 2d at 1130.
86. See id. at 1129 (noting that the government should only interfere where there is a threat of
significant harm to the child (citing Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998))).
87. Id.
The decision to absolve the provider of an activity from liability for any form of
negligence (regardless of the inherent risk or danger in the activity) goes beyond the
scope of determining which activity a person feels is appropriate for their [sic] child.
The decision to allow a minor to participate in an activity is properly left to the
parents or natural guardian.
Id.
88. Id. at 1129-30.
89. Id. at 1130 (citing FLA. STAT. § 744.301 (2008)).
Section 744.301, Florida Statutes, provides a statutory scheme wherein natural
guardians are granted limited rights to settle claims on behalf of minors. That statute
provides that parents are authorized to settle any claims or causes of action for
damages on behalf of their minor child without the necessity of court approval when
the amount does not exceed $15,000. Any settlement greater that [sic] $15,000 but
less than $25,000 may involve a guardian ad litem, if the court chooses to appoint
one, while a settlement in excess of $25,000 requires a court-appointed guardian as
well as a specific determination by the court that the settlement is in the best interest
of the minor. There is no comparable statutory scheme governing the issue of pre-
injury releases signed by a parent on behalf of a minor child.
If the legislature wished to grant a parent the authority to bind a minor's estate
by signing a pre-injury release, they could have said so. The legislature has decided
when the state, as parens patriae, should intervene on behalf of a minor. There is a
significant statutory framework in place relating to dependency and juvenile
delinquency, which evidences the legislature's exercise of the parens patriae
authority. That statutory scheme does not authorize one parent to release property
rights of the child except as specified.
Id. (citations omitted).
90. Id. ('There is no basis in common law for a parent to enter into a compromise or
settlement of a child's claim, or to waive substantive rights of the child without court approval."
(citing Romish v. Albo, 291 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), vacated on other grounds,
Venus Labs. v. Katz, 573 So. 2d 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), and 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and
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legislate that which necessarily must originate, if it is to be law, with the
legislature."93 The appellate court ultimately decided against finding the
preinjury release enforceable and reversed the lower court's grant of
summary judgment.
B. The Florida Supreme Court's Treatment of Preinjury
Waivers Prior to Kirton
The Florida Supreme Court answered the question of "whether a
parent may bind a minor's estate by the pre-injury execution of a
release" in the negative.94 The court considered the public policy con-
cerns and the potential chilling effect on the willingness of individuals to
volunteer amidst a potential minefield of personal liability, in the
absence of waivers. From the outset of the opinion's second footnote,
the court expressly stated that its decision in Kirton v. Fields should not
be read as limited solely to preinjury releases signed in the context of
for-profit commercial activities.9 5 The enforceability of preinjury
releases is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.96 Such releases
contrast the rights of parents to raise their children against those of the
state to protect minors.
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Florida Constitution make
clear that parents have a constitutionally protected authority to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.97 A
presumption exists that "fit" parents act in the best interests of their chil-
dren. That presumption, however, is not absolute. On the contrary, it is
precisely within this realm of limits that the court found sufficient rea-
son for the state as parens patriae98 to trump parental authority in the
context of a preinjury release.
First, the court discounted the defendants' assertion that a parent's
right to execute a preinjury release on behalf of a minor falls within the
ambit of section 744.301(2) of the Florida Statutes.99 The defendants
argued that when the father signed the release, Christopher's "claim"
93. Id.
94. Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 350 (Fla. 2008).
95. Id. at 350 n.2 ("[A]ny discussion on pre-injury releases in noncommercial activities would
be dicta and it is for that reason we do not discuss the broader question posed by the Fifth
District.").
96. Id. at 352 (citing D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314 (Fla. 2003)).
97. Id. (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion) and Beagle v.
Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275 (Fla. 1996)).
98. Parens patriae is defined as the state acting as the "provider of protection to those unable
to care for themselves." BLACK'S LAW DICnONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009).
99. This statutory provision allows a parent, acting as the natural guardian of a minor child, to
settle the child's claim for amounts up to $15,000. FLA. STAT. § 744.301(2) (2009).
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was less than $15,000.and was therefore valid under the statute.' °° The
court disagreed, finding the statute applied only to instances in which the
child already had a valid claim against another party. 11 This was clearly
not the case here, as the minor had not even mounted the ATV when the
father signed the release. The court also noted the absence of guidance
from the Florida legislature regarding preinjury releases as evidence that
there has been no legislative ban on releases executed by parents for
their children.'0° However, in the absence of a relevant statutory basis,
the court concluded that public policy concerns override the statutory
void with respect to parental preinjury releases, and therefore parents
cannot legally shift the property interests of their children through pre-
injury releases.103
Florida courts have previously, though not consistently, opined on
the enforceability of preinjury releases. The Fourth District confronted
an arbitration setting provision in Shea v. Global Travel Marketing,
Inc."4 There, a mother signed an agreement covering herself and her
minor child, which included a release of liability and an arbitration pro-
vision.' 5 The father brought a wrongful death suit against the safari
operator after his son was mauled to death by hyenas during the trip.
10 6
The trial court granted the safari operator's motion to stay proceedings
and compel arbitration of the claim based on the language of the
waiver.'0 7 The Fourth District reversed, finding the arbitration agree-
ment unenforceable as to the child on public policy grounds."0 The
appellate court distinguished this case from instances in which a parent
may be entitled to waive a minor's litigation rights when necessary for
the child to undertake an activity beneficial to her health, such as
obtaining insurance or medical care, and participating in community-
oriented or school-supported activities." 9
100. Kirton, 997 So. 2d at 353.
101. Id. at 353-54.
102. Id. at 354 (citing Global Travel Mktg., Inc. v. Shea, 908 So. 2d 392, 400 (Fla. 2005)).
103. Id.
104. 870 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), quashed, 908 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2005). See
generally Douglas P. Gerber, Note, The Validity of Binding Arbitration Agreements and
Children's Personal Injury Claims in Florida After Shea v. Global Travel Marketing, Inc., 28
NOVA L. REv. 167 (2003).
105. See Global Travel Mktg., 908 So. 2d at 395.
106. id. at 395 & n.l.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 396.
109. Shea, 870 So. 2d at 25.
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V. SETTING THE STAGE: THE LAW OF ARBITRATION AND
PREINJURY WAIVERS
There has been significant scholarship of the import of Shea in
arbitration setting clauses. In Accomazzo v. CEDU Educational Services,
Inc.,"'o the minor's parents enrolled him in three programs for juveniles
with emotional, behavioral, and academic problems. Upon entering each
program, the minor's father signed a participant contract, which con-
tained an arbitration provision that required all disputes arising from the
agreement to be submitted to binding arbitration.IlI The minor was later
injured in a physical confrontation with a counselor from the program.
As a result, the minor's parents filed claims of battery, negligence, and
violation of state laws protecting children." 2 The school moved to stay
litigation as a result of the contracts that bound the parties to arbitra-
tion." 3 That motion was denied by the district court as to the minor's
claims against the defendants. Affirming the district court's ruling, the
Supreme Court of Idaho ruled that the arbitration clause was not binding
on the minor as a result of the language used in the contract."1 4
In Troshak v. Terminix International Co.," 5 the homeowner's
minor child was rendered unconscious as a result of the toxic fumes
produced by a pesticide treatment performed by Terminix in the family
home. Prior to performance of Terminix's services, the minor's father
signed the "Termite Service Plan," containing the terms and conditions
under which Terminix was to provide the termite-control services.' 16
Despite the terms requiring arbitration, the minor's parents filed a civil
action against Terminix seeking damages for personal injury and prop-
erty damage. The company removed the case to federal court based on
diversity and moved to stay litigation pending arbitration due to the fact
that the minor's father had agreed to arbitrate any controversies arising
under the company's service agreement." 17 The district court determined
that the minor's parents were bound by the arbitration agreement; how-
ever the question remained whether the agreement was binding on the
minor. 18
Due to the void of Pennsylvania precedent, the federal district court
needed to determine how the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would rule
110. 15 P.3d 1153 (Idaho 2000).
111. Id. at 1155.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1156.
115. No. CIV.A.98-1727, 1998 WL 401693 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1998).
116. Id. at *2.
117. Id. at *1.
118. Id. at *3-4.
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on such a matter if brought before it." 9 As such, the court turned to
applicable federal cases that held parents could not waive the legal
claims of their children simply because of the parental relationship.
Thus, the court found that a child could not be bound by his parents'
agreement to arbitrate.120 The court stated,
If a parent cannot prospectively release the potential claims of a
minor child, then a parent does not have authority to bind a minor
child to an arbitration provision that requires the minor to waive their
right to have potential claims for personal injury filed in a court of
law.
12 1
In Fleetwood Enterprises v. Gaskamp,122 the parents of a sick child
filed suit against Fleetwood Enterprises on behalf of themselves and
their children alleging personal injury resulting from exposure to formal-
dehyde in the family's mobile home. The district court compelled arbi-
tration, and, on appeal, the Gaskamps argued that the arbitration
provision was procedurally unconscionable. 123 The court of appeals did
not agree and held that the parties were required to arbitrate. 124 How-
ever, because the children were not signatories or third-party benefi-
ciaries of the contract, the minor children could not be forced to
arbitrate. 25
In Lantz v. Iron Horse Saloon,1 26 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
of Florida upheld the lower court's issuance of a motion to dismiss
where a minor's guardian had waived liability so the child could ride a
bike on the Iron Horse premises. The decision was not based on whether
the guardian had the authority to execute the preinjury release on behalf
of the minor, but instead on the language used in the release to clearly
and unequivocally relieve Iron Horse from liability. 27
In Gonzalez v. City of Coral Gables,128 the Third District Court of
Appeal upheld the entry of summary judgment against a mother who
signed a release for her minor child to participate in the Coral Gables
Fire Rescue Explorer Program. The court found the "explorer program
falls within the category of commonplace child oriented community or
school supported activities for which a parent or guardian may waive his
119. Id. at *4.
120. Id. at *5.
121. Id.
122. 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir.), modified, 303 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2002).
123. Id. at 1070-71.
124. See id. at 1077.
125. Id.
126. 717 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), abrogated by Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349
(Fla. 2008).
127. See id. at 591-92.
128. 871 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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or her child's litigation rights in authorizing the child's participation."'' 2 9
The Third District has also held releases for school-supported activities
to be enforceable, where a parent waived liability on behalf of a minor
participating on a high school cheerleading squad.130
Examining a preinjury release in a commercial context, the Fifth
District Court of Appeal concluded in Applegate v. Cable Water Ski'3 1
that a parent's execution of a preinjury release did not prevent a child
from suing after becoming injured while wakeboarding at a camp. The
appellate court expressly limited its decision to commercial enterprises
because for-profit companies have the financial resources to insure
against the risk of loss and include the price of insurance in the cost
associated with participating in the activity giving rise to the injury.' 32
The courts have shown similar distaste for honoring preinjury
parental waivers as they have in evaluating an adult's ability to bring
suit after signing a release. For example, the Second District Court of
Appeal considered the enforceability of an exculpatory clause within a
preinjury release in Murphy v. YMCA of Lake Wales. 133 When Elizabeth
Murphy became a member of the YMCA, she signed a waiver that
included the following language:
I am an adult over 18 years of age and wish to participate in Lake
Wales Family YMCA activities. In addition . . . I understand that
even when every reasonable precaution is taken, accidents can some-
times still happen .... I understand that this release includes any
claims based on negligence, action or inaction of the Lake Wales
Family YMCA ....
After becoming injured while using the exercise equipment at the
YMCA, Murphy brought suit alleging negligent failure to maintain,
inspect, and repair the exercise equipment. 35
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of YMCA, stat-
ing that "[w]ith some concern, the Court finds the Waiver is clear and
unequivocal."1 36 Noting that "[e]xculpatory clauses are disfavored and
129. Id. at 1067 (citing Shea v. Global Travel Mktg., Inc., 870 So. 2d 20, 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003), quashed, 908 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2005)).
130. See Krathen v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe County, 972 So. 2d 887, 889-90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
131. 974 So. 2d 1112, 1113-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
132. Id. at 1115.
133. 974 So. 2d 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
134. Id. at 566.
135. Id. at 566-67.
136. Id. at 567(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("The trial court
expressed some concern over the 'reasonable precaution' language in the waiver: 'I kind of think
it is a little misleading when it reads: 'I understand that even when every reasonable precaution is
taken, accidents can sometimes [still] happen.'" (alteration in original)).
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will be strictly construed against the party claiming to be relieved of
liability,"1 37 the court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judg-
ment and held that the "reasonable reader might be led to believe that
the waiver of liability extends only to claims for injuries that were una-
voidable 'even when every reasonable precaution' had been taken by the
YMCA."1 38 It follows that the court's aversion for exculpatory agree-
ments equally applies in the context of preinjury waivers signed on
behalf of children.
Federal courts in Florida have also opined on the issue. In In re
Complaint of Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held a preinjury release unenforceable
where it was signed by a father for his minor child, and the minor was
later injured on a jet ski at Royal Caribbean's private island in the Baha-
mas. ' 39 Relying upon Shea, the court held the release unenforceable as it
was "signed on behalf of a minor child for an activity run by a for-profit
business, outside of a school or community setting."1 40 On the same fact
pattern, a different federal district judge relied upon Gonzalez and cases
from Massachusetts, 4 ' California,14 and Ohio 14 3 to reach a distinction
between parental preinjury releases involving activities relating to a
school, community, or volunteer-run event and those relating to private,
for-profit activities.' 44 "Generally, parental pre-injury releases are
upheld when they involve activities related to school, volunteer, or com-
munity events but are invalidated when they involve activities related to
private for-profit activities."' 45
Despite recent opinions that have not bound minors to arbitration,
other courts require the minor to seek redress before an arbitral panel to
ensure redress of inequitable outcomes. There is a clear distinction
between parents waving the rights of minors in the arbitration context
and parents waiving the rights of minors to seek redress in a court of
law. By providing a spectrum of everything in between the two
137. Id. at 567-68 (citing Theis v. J & J Racing Promotions, 571 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) and Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 580 So. 2d 628, 634 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
138. Id. at 568; see also Goyings v. Jack & Ruth Eckerd Found., 403 So. 2d 1144, 1145-46
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that genuine issues of fact existed where the language of the
exculpatory agreement "did not explicitly state that the [defendant] would be absolved from
liability for injuries resulting from its negligence").
139. 403 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
140. Id.
141. Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738 (Mass. 2002).
142. Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 3d 1559 (Ct. App. 1990).
143. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio 1998).
144. See In re Complaint of Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1279-80
(S.D. Fla. 2006).
145. Id. at 1279.
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extremes, the courts provide a means for everyone to find a happy
medium. Today there remains a clear split within some judicial circuits
as to the enforceability of parents' preinjury agreement to submit claims
of arbitration before seeking judicial redress. 146
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF KIRTON IN FLORIDA AND
ACROSS THE COUNTRY
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Kirton reveals a subtle
suspicion of deference to parental discretion in light of public policy.
However, as the court reiterated seventy years ago, "[p]ublic policy is
the cornerstone-the foundation-of all Constitutions, statutes, and
judicial decisions; and its latitude and longitude, its height and its depth,
greater than any or all of them." '47 After all, the primary purpose of
public policy is justice. 4 a Courts across the country have underscored
the injustice that can result to children who are victimized twice: first by
the actions of a tortfeasor, and second by their inability to recover dam-
ages because their parents, without the informed advice of the child,
have waived the child's day in court.'49 Based on the very nature of the
American tort system,15 ° a parent's absolute waiver of a potential suit
against a commercial entity, or any party for that matter, greatly dimin-
ishes the potential risk to the enterprise. 5 '
State courts across the nation have examined the validity of
preinjury releases executed by parents and guardians on behalf of
minors. They have found a clear distinction between releases covering
school-run, community-sponsored activities and releases covering for-
profit activities. For example, in Sharon v. City of Newton, a sixteen-
year-old was injured while participating in cheerleading practice at a
public high school. 152 Three months before the injury, her father had
signed a release waiving the school's liability for any damages relating
146. See, e.g., Costanza v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.02-1492, 2002 WL 31528447 (E.D.
La. Nov. 12, 2002). In Costanza, parents brought negligence claims against various businesses
allegedly as a result of injuries their children sustained when water leaked into their home. Of the
many parties against whom the Costanzas filed suit, two of the defendants moved to compel
arbitration because of an arbitration agreement that the parents had voluntarily signed. The parents
relied on Fleenvood Enterprises v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1073 (5th Cir. 2002), arguing that
their children should not be bound by the signed arbitration clause because they were not third-
party beneficiaries or signatories. Costanza, 2002 WL 31528447, at *6.
147. City of Leesburg v. Ware, 153 So. 87, 89-90 (Fla. 1934).
148. Id. at 89.
149. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1234-36 (Colo. 2002) (en banc),
superseded by statute, CoLo. RaV. STAT. § 13-22-107 (2003).
150. See supra Part III.A.
151. See supra Part II.
152. Sharon v. City of Newton, 769 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Mass. 2002).
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to the daughter's participation in the school's athletic programs. 153 Upon
reaching the age of majority, the cheerleader filed suit against the city
for negligence and negligent hiring and retention of the cheerleading
coach. 54 The trial court granted the city's motion for summary judg-
ment, noting that "[a] contrary ruling would detrimentally chill a
school's ability to offer voluntary athletic and other extracurricular
programs."' 5
5
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts first noted that "[a]
party may, by agreement, allocate risk and exempt itself from liability
that it might subsequently incur as a result of its own negligence."
1 56
Second, while most contracts signed with a minor are voidable at the age
of majority, the father here
made an important family decision cognizant of the risk of physical
injury to his child and the financial risk to the family as a whole. In
the circumstance of a voluntary, nonessential activity, we will not
disturb this parental judgment. This comports with the fundamental
liberty interest of parents in the rearing of their children, and is not
inconsistent with the purpose behind our public policy permitting
minors to void their contracts. 1 57
Finally, the court held that requiring releases as a condition of voluntary
participation in extracurricular sports activities is consistent with the
public policy of encouraging athletic programs for the state's youth.
15 8
Further, holding such releases unenforceable might lead to financial
costs and risks that could reduce extracurricular activities. 59
In Hohe v. San Diego Unified School District, fifteen-year-old Sara
Hohe was injured during a hypnotism show sponsored by the Parent,
Teacher and Student Association ("PTSA") of the local, public high
school. 160 Prior to participating in the show, Hohe and her father both
signed two waivers, releasing the PTSA, high school, school district,
and hypnotist from any liability.' 6' The trial court held that the releases
barred the action. The appellate court began by addressing the policy
concerns, finding that "[n]o public policy opposes private, voluntary
transactions in which one party, for a consideration, agrees to shoulder a
risk which the law would otherwise have placed upon the other
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 741-42 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 744.
157. Id. at 746-47.
158. Id. at 747-48.
159. See id. at 747.
160. Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 224 Cal. App. 3d 1559, 1562 (Ct. App. 1990).
161. Id. at 1563.
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party."'1 62 The court then noted the thousands of recreational activities in
which volunteers are asked to give up their right to bring suit so that
groups like the Boy and Girl Scouts, Little League, and parent-teacher
associations can operate without the risks and overwhelming costs of
litigation. Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment because the scope of the release was ambig-
uous and failed to alert the parent that the child would be barred from
recovery based on bodily injury.' 63 This is the same result as predicated
in cases involving exculpatory agreements.
In Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, a mother signed a release cover-
ing her seven-year-old's participation in a nonprofit organization that
provided children with the opportunity to learn and play soccer.' Bas-
ing its decision on the fact that "invalidation of exculpatory agreements
would reduce the number of activities made possible through the uncom-
pensated services of volunteers and their sponsoring organizations," the
court recognized the benefits received by the public from such releases
for school-sponsored and volunteer activities. 6 ' The court held against
"disturb[ing]" the mother's judgment to sign the release because she
wanted her son to play soccer and made an important family decision to
assume the risk of the cost of physical injury inflicted upon her son. 16 6
In Kirton v. Fields, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that
while parents have a fundamental right to make decisions about the care
and upbringing of their children, there are wider public policy concerns
involved in governing a parent's ability to wholly waive her minor's
property interest in obtaining damages for resulting torts.' 67 The court
held against assuming that a parent who voluntarily waives risks on
behalf of a minor child's physical well-being has acted in the child's
best interest:
When a parent executes such a release and a child is injured, the
provider of the activity escapes liability while the parent is left to deal
with the financial burden of an injured child. If the parent cannot
afford to bear that burden, the parties who suffer are the child, other
family members, and the people of the State who will be called on to
bear that financial burden. 168
Therefore, upholding exculpatory agreements does not ensure the wel-
162. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. at 1567-68.
164. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 202-03 (Ohio 1998).
165. Id. at 205.
166. Id. at 207.
167. See Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 352-54 (Fla. 2008).
168. Id. at 357.
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fare of the child, but instead protects the interests of the activity
provider.
The Utah Supreme Court faced a scenario factually similar to
Kirton v. Fields in 2001. In July 1997, eleven-year-old Jessica Hawkins
went to Duck Creek, Utah, for a family reunion.' 69 During the reunion,
members of the family arranged for Navajo Trails (defendant Peart) to
provide horses and guides for a trail ride. 170 Prior to the ride, Navajo
Trails required Jessica's mother to sign a "Release Form" that provided
in relevant part:
Riding and handling horses can be DANGEROUS. This form must
be completed and signed before you can ride .... By signing this
form, you agree to ASSUME THE RISK of any injury, death, or loss,
or damage which you or your child ... may suffer .... In considera-
tion for the rendering of trail riding ... service by Navajo Trails ...
[t]he undersigned on behalf of himself or for any person for whom he
or she is a parent or legal guardian, does hereby indemnify (reim-
burse), release, and forever hold harmless, Navajo Trails ... [for] any
claims, demands, and actions or causes of action on account of death
or injury or loss or damage which may occur from any cause, without
regard to negligence, other than the gross negligence or willful mis-
conduct of Navajo Trails .... If the undersigned is a parent or guard-
ian, he or she further agrees to indemnify (reimburse) Navajo Trails
or such persons for any damages paid by or assessed against Navajo
Trails ... as a result of injury to or death of a child ....
The mother read the contract and signed the form. 172 While on trail
ride, Hawkins's horse became spooked and threw her off its back, caus-
ing Hawkins to become injured.' 73 She brought suit against Navajo
Trails claiming that the company failed to provide a sufficient number of
guides, that the guides were not properly trained, and that the guides on
duty did not fulfill their duties.174 The company denied the negligence
claims and cited the "Release Form" as a bar to Hakwins's suit.' 75 There
would be far less of an incentive for businesses to protect the safety of
minor children if preinjury releases were legally recognized for commer-
cial activity providers. The court thereby concluded that parental
preinjury waivers must be held unenforceable against for-profit business
entities. 76
169. Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1063 (Utah 2001).
170. Id.
171. Id. (alterations in original).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1063--64.
175. Id. at 1064.
176. Id. at 1066.
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In sum, the tenuous split in the emerging jurisprudence hinges on a
careful balancing of parens patriae with the inherent rights owed to par-
ents. Weighing carefully on this equilibrium is the future of risk man-
agement to corporations engaged in business operations that cater to
young children. While a parent's unique relationship with her child must
be recognized as it relates to the ability to gauge the perils awaiting her
child, 177 parents may not fully understand the consequences of signing
exculpatory contracts or agreeing to arbitrate a potential dispute. 178 A
parent's signature on such a contract is at odds with the paternal protec-
tions owed to the child. 179 The state's role as parens patriae is not only a
means to shield children from a potentially misguided or poorly
informed parents, but also serves as a lasting reminder of the enormous
potential that enterprise risk management invokes on a corporation's
ability to continue in existence.
VII. THE FALLACY OF PREINJURY WAIVERS IN THE
WAKE OF KIRTON V. FIELDS
Following Kirton v. Fields, are preinjury releases still enforceable
under Florida law? The court has left the door to this question wide open
to await further inquiry. 180 A waiver is enforceable if its language is
clear and comports with public policy, or if the participant knowingly
and voluntarily surrenders her right against suit. 181 Courts have consid-
ered the enforceability of waivers covering sports players on many occa-
sions, particularly in high-risk situations.182 Courts have generally been
reluctant to enforce contracts intended to exculpate a party from liability
for his or her own negligence.' 83 Such contracts are closely scrutinized
177. See Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229, 1234 (Colo. 2002) (en banc), superseded
by statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-107 (2003).
178. Gerber, supra note 104, at 183.
179. Cooper, 48 P.3d at 1237.
180. See Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d at 361-62 (Pariente, J., concurring).
Finally, I write to emphasize that this Court limits its decision to activities provided
by commercial establishments because those were the facts presented by this case.
However, I do not agree with the reasoning of those cases cited by the majority that
have found that all releases from liability for noncommercial activities are
automatically valid. To me there is an important distinction between a release to
allow a child to participate in school activities, such as cheerleading or football,
which could be considered inherently dangerous, and a blanket release that absolves
the sponsor of liability from all negligent acts. As with commercial activities, when
a parent allows his or her child to participate in an inherently dangerous
noncommercial activity, his or her acceptance does not contemplate that the activity
provider will act negligently.
Id.
181. See Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 822 (Ct. App. 1996).
182. See, e.g., Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11 (Wash. 1992) (en banc).
183. Tumbough v. Ladner, 754 So. 2d 467, 469 (Miss. 1999).
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and are rarely upheld except in rare instances where the intention of the
parties is clearly and unambiguously expressed in the language of the
waiver. 184 To determine the intent of the parties, courts look to the four
corners of the instrument. 85 Oddly, however, it is not necessary that the
party actually have read the waiver prior to signing it.
186
Although courts are relatively likely to enforce waivers signed by
adults that relinquish the individual's ability to bring suit, jurists are
much more hesitant to honor waivers signed by parents on behalf of
their minor children. 87 In the latter instance, courts are split on the out-
come.188 For example, in Simmons v. Parkette National Gymnastic
Training Center, a mother signed a preinjury waiver waiving any claims
that she or her minor daughter could make against a gym.'89 The District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that the mother's
cause of action was barred by the exculpatory agreement but simultane-
ously found the contract voidable as against the minor.' 90 Similarly, in
Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Academy and Junior College, the court
held that an agreement signed by parents releasing a military school
"from all claims and damages arising from or related to or in any way
connected with their son Jerry's hemophilic condition"' 9 ' only released
the defendant school for liability against potential claims that the parents
might assert but did not bar suit by the minor son. 192 Finally, as noted
above, in Kirton, the Florida Supreme Court clearly held unenforceable
preinjury releases signed by a parent on behalf of a minor in the for-
profit commercial setting. 193
If preinjury releases are unenforceable, will we continue to see, and
be forced to sign, such waivers? In the path of Kirton v. Fields, the act of
a parent signing a preinjury waiver on behalf of a child no longer serves
a clear purpose. The question thus becomes more focused as to whether
there are exceptions when a preinjury waiver signed by a parent on
184. Id.
185. United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1970).
186. See Dixon v. Manier, 545 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976) (upholding exculpatory
contract where patron failed to review waiver prior to signing because she did not have her
reading glasses when she signed the waiver).
187. See, e.g., Simmons v. Parkette Nat'l Gymnastic Training Ctr., 670 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Pa.
1987).
188. See id.; Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 10 (Wash. 1992) (en banc).
189. Simmons, 670 F. Supp. at 141.
190. Id. at 142 ("Where a minor executes a contract, however, the agreement is not void, but
rather, voidable." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAc-rs § 7 (1981) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
191. Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Junior Coll., 630 F. Supp. 20, 22 (E.D. Pa.
1985).
192. Id. at 24.
193. Kirton v. Fields, 997 So. 2d 349, 358 (Fla. 2008).
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behalf of a minor is enforceable. In Kirton, the court began its opinion
with the second footnote stating, "Our decision in this case should not be
read as limiting our reasoning only to pre-injury releases involving com-
mercial activity; however, any discussion on pre-injury releases in non-
commercial activities would be dicta .. ,194 At the same time, the
court forecasted the adverse effects if the opinion were applied to non-
commercial settings.1 95 Throughout the ten-page majority opinion, the
court referred to the terms business or commercial entities twenty-three
times, while not once suggesting that the outcome be applied to commu-
nity-oriented or school-sponsored activities.'96 The looming query
remains how this opinion will adversely impact community organiza-
tions, volunteers, and charities.1 97
Professor Joseph H. King, Jr. notes, "The United States is burdened
by an unimaginable debt. It is unthinkable that we could afford to pay
for the services currently provided by volunteers. More than 85 million
Americans engage in volunteer activities."'' 98 They spend an average of
five hours per week, collectively, 16.5 total billion hours annually, val-
ued at $110 billion per year. 199 When considering that nonprofit entities
generally have little to no assets, the relatively deeper pockets lie with
the volunteers. If Kirton is extended to school-related or community-
sponsored activities, America risks losing this indispensable outlet for
services that the country would not otherwise be able to afford.
Since the recent shift in Florida law, where parents are no longer
able to sign preinjury waivers allowing their minor children to partici-
pate in commercial activities, businesses across the state have become
weary of exposure to total liability. Even businesses whose customer
194. Id. at 350 n.2.
195. See id. at 357 ("If pre-injury releases were invalidated, these volunteers would be faced
with the threat of lawsuits and the potential for substantial damage awards, which could lead
volunteers to decide that the risk is not worth the effort.").
196. See, e.g., id. at 358 ("Business owners owe their patrons a duty of reasonable care and to
maintain a safe environment for the activity they provide.").
197. See id. at 363 (Wells, J., dissenting).
Bands, cheerleading squads, sports teams, church choirs, and other groups that often
charge for their activities and performances will not know whether they are a
commercial activity because of the fees and ticket sales. How can these groups carry
on their activities that are so needed by youth if the groups face exposure to large
damage claims either by paying defense costs or damages? Insuring against such
claims is not a realistic answer for many activity providers because insurance costs
deplete already very scarce resources. The majority's decision seems just as likely
to force small-scale activity providers out of business as it is to encourage such
providers to obtain insurance coverage.
Id.
198. Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activities-The
Alternative to "'Nerf@" Tiddlywinks, 53 Omo ST. L.J. 683, 686 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
199. Id. at 686 & n.4.
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base is comprised mostly of adults have wheezed at the potential legal
implications affecting their patrons. These companies also cater to the
children in accompanying their parents. According to a March 2009
Orlando Sentinel article, central Florida theme parks, activity providers,
the Florida Restaurant and Lodging Association-including SeaWorld,
Disney World, and Gatorland-have joined the bandwagon to urge state
lawmakers to overturn Kirton v. Fields and are supporting two bills cur-
rently before the Florida legislature °.2 ° House Bill 363 and Senate Bill
886 seek to revise Section 744.301 of the Florida Statutes to allow natu-
ral guardians or parents to waive and release, in advance, any claim or
cause of action that would accrue to minor children to the same extent as
any adult. However, the state's trial lawyers argue that the measure is
overbroad and could lead to protecting truly negligent recreational busi-
nesses that threaten the safety of children across the State of Florida.201
Florida's economy relies heavily on tourism and related industry.
Businesses throughout the state, including companies that offer water-
scooter rentals, snorkeling tours, and sky diving tours through the Ever-
glades, all depend on the availability of preinjury waivers to absolve
litigation brought by patrons. These releases have far-reaching implica-
tions, as they may ultimately dovetail Florida's tourism-driven econ-
omy. For example, in 2004 alone, Florida received over 76.8 million
visitors amounting to $57 billion in revenue.20 2 Companies that cater to
tourism in Florida claim that they can only roll out the welcome mat to
the state's doorstep if the Florida legislature were to overturn the Florida
Supreme Court's decision. As this article goes to print, the Florida legis-
lature is currently debating a measure that would enable businesses to
shield against liability by using preinjury waivers. 2 3 Not surprisingly,
the state senator who introduced the bill represents a district that is in
close physical and economic proximity to Central Florida's tourism
haven.2o
If left unaltered by the Florida legislature, Kirton will have several
long-lasting impacts on the manner in which corporations, both in and
out of the state, anticipate risks that were previously immunized by
exculpatory agreements. First, corporate risk management offices must
200. Jason Garcia, Parks: Let Parents Say What's Safe, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 18, 2009, at
Al; Traci T. McKee, When a Clear and Unambiguous Pre-injury Release is Nonetheless
Unenforceable: The Effect and Implications of the Florida Supreme Court's Decision in Kirton v.
Fields, 28 No. 2 TRIAL ADvoc. Q. 6, 10 (2009).
201. Garcia, supra note 200.
202. State of Florida.com, Florida Quick Facts, http://www.stateofflorida.com/PortalV
DesktopDefault.aspxtabid=95 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
203. See S. 2440, 112th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2010).
204. See The Florida Senate, http://www.flsenate.gov/Legislators/ (follow "Michael S. 'Mike'
Bennett" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
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undertake a careful analysis of the consequences exposed by the invali-
dation of parental waivers.2 °5 Second, corporations will likely need to
carry additional insurance to cover lawsuits by minors, which are now
unleashed by the blanket voidance of certain preinjury waivers. 2°6 This
in turn will lead to the eventual rise in prices charged to customers, as
businesses receive the bills from the insurance contracts. In the end, the
consumer will face a higher cost to engage in certain activities as a result
of the delicate balancing between the state's role as parens patriae and
the parent's right to assess the perils awaiting her child.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Kirton v. Fields dramati-
cally overhauls the enforceability of preinjury waivers signed by parents
on behalf of their minor children. This case departs from existing statu-
tory law by holding commercial entities legally responsible for child
patrons, even in the presence of preinjury waivers signed by the minor's
parent. Indeed, Kirton places responsibilities on businesses across Flor-
ida, noting they are best apt to gauge potential hazards, liabilities, and
insulate risk by obtaining adequate insurance coverage to cover resulting
litigation and damages.
Despite an overt attempt against limiting Kirton to for-profit com-
mercial entities, the language, albeit in dicta, of the majority's ruling
appears to render exculpatory contracts unenforceable against commu-
nity-sponsored and school-related volunteers. The court recognized that
the true victims of enforceable preinjury waivers are the children them-
selves, the state, and family members, all of whom are generally left
financially vulnerable to provide for the injured minor. While settling
the legality involved in preinjury waivers, the opinion raises more ques-
tions than answers. Indeed, Kirton has rattled the skeletons fast asleep in
the closets of community-sponsored and school-related activity provid-
ers. We are still left staring at the 500-pound elephant in the middle of
the room, namely the potential for suit by volunteers even after the par-
ents of the minors signed preinjury waivers.
The future is still uncertain as parties join the intense battle to
205. See Dyer, supra note 35, at 494.
First, the entity seeking to manage its risk must determine which of its activities
create a potential for loss or exposure to liability. Once the entity determines which
activities create potential losses, it must calculate the potential amount of loss. The
potential amount is not simply the total amount the entity stands to lose. Rather, it is
the total potential loss multiplied by the percentage chance that the loss will occur.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
206. See generally Marc R. Stanley, When Bad Companies Happen to Good People, 56 DRAKE
L. REV. 517 (2008).
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change Kirton. When the final spike is served across the net, the Florida
Supreme Court may yet to have the last word on a parent's ability to
weigh and relinquish the property rights of her children. In 1533, Martin
Luther warned of the import of good corporate citizenship: "Everyone
should conduct his trade, craft and business in such a way that he
overcharges no one, cheats no one with false wares, is satisfied with a
fair profit, and gives people something worthwhile for their penny."207
Nearly 500 years later, the penny paid for another's trade will likely go
toward insurance against future litigation.
207. Id. at 517-18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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